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This paper shows that political competition generates incentives that affect the pace of 
adoption of market reforms in the context of policy convergence. Previous work shows 
the effect of financial and technological pressures in promoting policy convergence and 
the impact of institutional constraints on shaping the pace of policymaking. Controlling 
for these effects, this paper demonstrates the policy effects of political competition and 
ideological polarization between the incumbent and its contenders even at a time when 
ideological policy differences seem to be fading due to policy convergence. In studying 
policy adoption, we use duration analysis for the 18 countries of Latin America during 







arket-oriented reforms in telecom and electricity—including the privatization 
of assets, the liberalization of markets, and the separation of regulatory 
authority from operations—spread rapidly around the globe, and especially 
through Latin America, during the last part of the twentieth century. In 1980 only 10% 
of countries had adopted market reforms in electricity and 6% in telecoms; by 1999 
these figures had risen to 41% and 73%, respectively. By the same date, 88% of the 
Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries of Latin America—excluding non-capitalist 
Cuba—had adopted some market reforms in electricity, and 94% of them had done so 
in telecoms (Henisz et al 2005). The rapid adoption of market reforms in telecom and 
electricity in the region contrasts with the slow pace of their earlier nationalization, 
which started in the late nineteen century and extended through the end of the 1970s.1 
The rapid adoption of market reforms in these sectors is explained by technological 
changes along with the competition for attracting increasingly mobile capital with 
policies favorable to investors. Whereas competition for footloose capital has promoted 
market-oriented policies across the board (Simmons 1999, Strange 1996), various studies 
have linked the diffusion of market reforms in telecom and electricity across the world to 
technological change, pressures from international financial institutions, and emulation 
of peer countries (Levi-Faur 1999, 2004, Henisz et al 2005).  
The pressures for adopting market-oriented policies are even stronger in capital-scarce 
developing countries, such as those in Latin America, because investors’ policy demands 
on these countries are more exhaustive than for advanced economies (Mosley 2003). In 
Latin America particularly, these pressures were heightened by the consequences of the 
debt crisis in the early 1980s. By sharpening the shortage of domestic capital and 
heightening fiscal deficits, the debt crisis increased the pressure to adopt market-oriented 
economic policies. Moreover, the diffusion of these policies was facilitated by the 
common cultural and religious background of Latin American countries and by the 
active role of international financial institutions as a source of capital and technical 
advice across the region.2 As publicly-owned utilities suffered from underinvestment and 
technological delay in a context of capital scarcity, market-oriented reforms were both 
useful to attract investment and to generate fiscal resources through the sale of assets. 
Consequently, Latin America was the region of the world with the highest proceeds from 
privatization during the 1990s, and most of that revenue was generated by the 
privatization of public utilities (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes 2005: 5). Yet, studies on 
privatization show that, despite the strong regional effect, there was variation in the pace 
                                                 
1 Moreover, there were discontinuities in the nationalization process. Peaks of nationalization were during 
the 1940s and 1960s in telecom and during the 1950s and 1970s in electricity. 
2 Simmons and Elkins (2004) show that dominant language, common colonial heritage, and common 
dominant religion come close to capturing the identity orientations shared by countries and have an effect 
on the diffusion of economic policies, such as exchange rate, capital and current account policies (p.184). 
Teichman (2001) discuss the importance of international financial institutions and technocrats on policy 
diffusion in the region. Henisz et al (2005) show their influence on the diffusion of public utility reforms. 
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of reform across Latin American countries and they suggest that political variables were 
behind much of this variation (Chong 2005, Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes 2004).  
In this article we explain the effect of political competition on the pace of market reforms 
in telecom and electricity, which were the two largest sectors in terms of privatization 
revenue.3 They are also crucial infrastructure sectors for economic development, as well 
as essential public services, which are expected by most of the population to be effectively 
delivered by the state. Thus, they are crucial components in understanding patterns of 
policymaking in a region characterized by erratic economic growth and unstable polities 
in the last century. We focus specifically on the adoption of three market-oriented 
policies: privatization, market liberalization, and the establishment of regulators 
separated from operation. Using these three policies, we explain why Latin American 
governments that were facing similar technological and financial pressures for policy 
adoption chose to implement them at a different pace.  
We make two contributions in this article. First, we show that political competition 
affects the pace of reform. We argue that the risks faced by incumbents with small 
electoral and legislative margins shape their incentives to adopt policy reform. Further, 
the relative ideological position of the incumbent and its contenders determines the 
credibility of policy alternatives. Second, we argue that these effects vary not only across 
countries but also across sectors. By comparing across sectors and countries, we provide 
evidence that the higher politicization of electricity makes political competition more 
influential on policy adoption in this sector than in telecom.4 Indeed, political 
considerations brought several countries in the region to postpone privatization of 
electricity until after the sector had been opened to private investment. 
In studying policy adoption, we use duration analysis for the 18 Spanish and Portuguese 
speaking countries of Latin America in the 1985-2000 period, when most of the market 
reforms in public utilities were adopted.5 Table 1 shows the variation in the dependent 
variable—the timing of policy adoption—across countries, industries, and policies. It 
shows both the relative convergence of most countries in the region toward market 
reforms in telecom and electricity by the end of the period, as well as the variation in the 
pace at which countries adopted policy reform. We include dates for the decision to 
privatize (as well as the date when the sale of the main companies started), for the 
liberalization of markets, and for the establishment of regulatory agencies separated from 
operation. By the end of 2000, fifteen countries had decided to privatize telecoms (in the 
Dominican Republic, telecom had been private since the 1930s) and eleven had private 
operators in place (including the Dominican Republic). Meanwhile, fourteen countries 
had taken the decision to sell electricity assets and eleven had already privatized. Sixteen 
countries had opened the electricity market to private investment. Eleven countries had 
opened the long-distance telecom market to competition and ten had done it for local 
                                                 
3 Whereas telecom offerings account for 36% of world privatization proceeds between 1990 and 2000, 
electricity privatization accounts for 16%, in Latin America 75% of the value of privatization revenue 
come from utilities and infrastructure (Chong 2005: 8-9). 
4 On the use of cross-sectoral and cross-national comparisons, see Levi-Faur and Jordana (2005) and 
Murillo (2001). 
5 We exclude non-capitalist Cuba from our study because it did not face the same pressures for policy 
diffusion, nor did it have the same logic of political competition as the other cases. The starting point of 
1985 was chosen as the divestiture of AT&T in the US and the privatization of British Telecom in 1984 
provided strong impetus to these reforms across the world. 
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communications. Finally, the establishment of telecom and electricity regulators had 
been accomplished in all countries, with the partial exception of Paraguay. 
 
******* TABLE 1 HERE  ******* 
 
The implications of market reforms, and especially privatization, for these sectors have 
been considerable. The volume edited by Chong and López-de-Silanes (2004) analyzes 
the consequences of privatization in seven Latin American countries, reaching the 
conclusion that it improved efficiency, increased productivity, and expanded access to 
public services. Using our own data, we find that the mean rate of change in the density 
of telephone lines and electricity consumption per capita in the region was higher in 
most cases after the sale of assets through privatization began than it was before.6 Indeed, 
a difference of means test shows that on average the mean rate of growth for either 
service among countries that privatized was significantly greater after the public company 
was sold.7 
There is some controversy, however, about the distributive effects of privatization. In 
spite of its apparent effect on efficiency and access to public services, Latin American 
public opinion is not favorable to the privatization of public services (Carrera et al 2005). 
Birdsall and Nellis (2002), who agree with the improvements in productivity and 
efficiency, point out to potential deleterious effects on income inequality. Indeed, some 
of these effects may be produced by the improvement in efficiency since part of the 
negative price impact of electricity privatization stems from the elimination of illegal 
connections.8 Both the actual effect of privatization on the delivery of public services and 
its effect on the public’s perception of access to these utilities make the reform of these 
sectors consequential and highlight the importance of understanding the role of political 
competition in policy adoption.  
The remainder of the article is divided into six sections. The first section presents our 
argument on the competing effects of technological and financial pressures versus the 
incentives generated by political competition on the adoption of public utility reform. 
The second section presents our indicators for the explanatory variables, as well as our 
modeling strategy. Sections three to five present empirical results for privatization, 
market liberalization, and the establishment of regulators, respectively. The last section 
concludes with some implications for studying the reform of public utilities and 
policymaking in the region. 
                                                 
6 The year in which privatization began is taken out of the sample. Exceptions are the Dominican Republic 
in telecom and Colombia, Guatemala and El Salvador in electricity. 
7 This is also true if we use the number of telephone connections and the level of electricity consumption, 
or the change in these indicators. Differences in means were tested using the ttest command in Stata. The 
null hypothesis (mean (after) – mean (before)=diff=0) was rejected with 99% confidence in favor of the 
hypothesis that diff>0 for all versions of the test, with the exception of the rate of change in electricity 
consumption, which was rejected with 94% confidence. It is important to note that these means refer to 
changes in teledensity and electricity consumption after the first sale of assets, not the approval of 
privatization. 
8 In Argentina 436,000 of the first 481,000 additional subscribers to the privatized electricity system had 
illegal hook-ups and Birdsall and Nellis (2002: 22) assume that those were lower-income people. 
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| 1 | POLICYMAKING AND PUBLIC UTILITY REFORM 
 
he effect of technological and financial pressures—as well as the impact of 
institutional constraints—on policymaking has been well studied. Thus, in this 
article we focus specifically on how political competition shapes the process of 
policy adoption. Whereas technological and financial pressures promote policy adoption 
and institutional constraints make it more difficult, the effect of political competition 
depends on the relative power—in terms of votes and seats—of the incumbent and its 
main challengers, as well as their relative ideological positions. The role of ideology is 
remarkable in light of the seemingly pragmatic adoption of market reforms in the 
context of strong technological and financial pressures. Indeed, in line with the existing 
literature on policy convergence under economic duress in the region (Stokes 2001, 
Weyland 2002), we find that the ideological position of the incumbent party in a left-
right scale has no effect on market reforms.9  
Financial and technological pressures promote policy adoption. Financial pressures for 
policy adoption can be exercised by international financial institutions (Vreeland 2003) 
or by investors through credit ratings (Mosley 2003). In their study of public utility 
reform, Henisz et al. (2005) suggest that coercion from international financial 
institutions explains the adoption of privatization (as well as the establishment of 
regulators) across the globe. As the Latin American debt crisis heightened fiscal deficits 
and capital scarcity, it also increased the influence of international financial institutions 
as lenders of last resort, especially after the failure of the initial heterodox adjustment 
policies (Edwards 1995). Fiscal deficits provided a strong incentive for privatization as 
the sale of valuable assets serves for filling the public coffers (Castelar Pinheiro and 
Schneider 1994, Armijo 1999). The effect of technological pressures on policy adoption 
is suggested by the predominance of cross-sectoral patterns of policy adoption (earlier in 
sectors with more technological change) rather than cross-national patterns (earlier in 
countries with more favorable institutional context) according to Levi-Faur (1999, 
2004). As technological changes in telecom were broader than in electricity, the path of 
reform was faster in the former than in the latter (Bartle 2002).  
In addition to financial and technological pressures, political conditions also affect the 
process of policymaking—especially when reforms have a broad scope, as they tend to in 
public utilities. The literature on policymaking has long focused on the effect of 
institutional constraints on policy adoption. The volume edited by Haggard and 
McCubbins (2001) summarizes the effects of institutional constraints in presidential 
systems, such as those in Latin America. Institutional constraints include power 
distribution and political structures that generate veto points (Tsebelis 2002). Hence, in 
                                                 
9 We ran all our models using dummies for the ideological position of the incumbent – as opposed to its 
relative position vis a vis the opposition – and find that they were not significant in explaining the pace of 
market reforms in telecom and electricity in the region. Henisz et al (2005) find that the ideology of the 
incumbent has no effect on the reform of public utilities around the world. Using data from 26 OECD 
countries, Schenider et al (2005) also find that ideology has no effect on the privatization of infrastructure 
in the 1990s.  
T 
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analyzing policy adoption, we control for the effect of institutional constraints that 
makes changes from the status quo, such as policy adoption, harder.10  
Studies of institutional constraints and policymaking have usually centered on the 
powers of the president—combining the constraints of the presidency derived from the 
distribution of partisan power between the executive and the legislature. Because market 
reforms seem to signal the era of policy convergence across different political ideologies, 
we are particularly interested in the effect of ideological differences between the 
incumbent and his or her opponents. Measures of restrictions to presidential capacity 
based solely on party loyalties disregard the polarization that can be generated by 
contenders that are farther away ideologically from the incumbent and have fewer 
incentives to compromise on policymaking. Ideological polarization can shape inter-
branch conflict by restricting the universe of possible policy coalitions and generating 
incentives for policy obstruction rather than compromise. 11 This type of political 
obstruction is likely to emerge for any policy, but will tend to be more prevalent when 
legislative obstruction can have effects on public opinion as it is likely to happen for 
policies that have a broad effect on the population. 
Whereas both institutional constraints and ideological distance should have an effect on 
the incentives to adopt or obstruct any policy, the effect of polarization ought to be even 
stronger on the adoption of policies that have broad effects on the population. Similarly, 
the impact of political competition between the incumbent and his or her contenders on 
policymaking should be particularly important when policies are not only publicly visible 
but also have a potential electoral impact. We analyze two dimensions of this effect: a) 
the relative power—measured in votes and seats—of the incumbent and his o her main 
challengers, and b) the relative ideological position of the incumbent and of his or her 
opposition. Power differentials affect the extent to which policy adoption represents an 
electoral risk for the incumbent as well as the costs that legislative defeat entails. 
Ideological positioning affects the credibility of policy alternatives, which is an important 
consideration in politician’s electoral strategy.  
The first dimension of political competition centers on the difference in votes between 
the incumbent and his or her main political opponents. Smaller electoral margins 
increase the risks of adopting a potentially unpopular policy as they increase the marginal 
value of votes. Smaller legislative margins hamper the government’s ability to adopt their 
desired policy and increase the costs of a legislative defeat. The second dimension focuses 
on ideological incentives, even in the context of policy adoption under technological and 
financial pressures that induce pragmatism in policy preferences. We focus both on the 
ideological stance of the incumbent and the opposition and on their relative ideological 
position because the credibility of policy alternatives is shaped by both these factors. On 
one hand, if the opposition is to the left of the incumbent, it will be able to more credibly 
propose alternatives to market reforms for disaffected voters. On the other hand, 
                                                 
10 Because we are not exploring their effect on the actual sale of assets but rather on the authorization of 
privatization, we are not looking directly at the credibility effects of institutional configurations as 
described by Levy and Spiller (1995). As shown by Henisz and Zellner (2005), institutional constraints 
may increase policy resoluteness (and regulatory stability) and thereby induce investment.  
11 Similarly, Bassinger and Hallelberg (2004) show that ideological distance between veto players increases 
transaction costs of policymaking and makes governments less responsive to financial and trade pressures 
for decreasing their tax rates in OECD countries. 
 6
regardless of where the incumbent lies on the ideological spectrum, when the incumbent 
faces opposition from parties that are right-wing, which are more likely to agree with 
market oriented policies, an appeal from the opposition to voters opposed to these 
policies will hardly be credible. Other things held equal, an opposition that stands to the 
ideological left of the incumbent should make reform adoption harder, while the 
existence of an opposition formed of right-wing parties should make it more likely. 
Finally, whereas ideology seems not to have a substantive impact on the trend to market 
reforms in the region, we believe that in policies of lower public visibility—such as the 
establishment of regulatory authorities that has no immediate effect on prices or 
supply—we should observe the effect of ideological legacies from state intervention on 
the likelihood of policy reform. The prevalence of pragmatism in policy adoption is 
illustrated by the fact that left-wing parties in office were no less likely to adopt market 
reforms than other parties. However, legacies from previous nationalization can have an 
effect on the establishment of regulatory authorities because, of the three policies that 
constitute the standard market-oriented package of public utility reform, this one is the 
only one that involves re-regulation rather than state retrenchment (Vogel 1996, Levi-
Faur 2002). As a result, we expect political parties with a legacy of nationalization to be 
more favorable to the establishment of regulatory authorities in the sectors where they 
had promoted state intervention in the past because technical cadres to which they 
delegate policymaking have acquired their experience in the previously publicly-owned 
sector. By contrast, we associate the adoption of privatization with a more pragmatic 
response to financial and technological pressures and thus expect legacies of state 
intervention to have a stronger effect on the credibility of policies for potential 
opponents than on the government’s preferences over policy reform. As a result, we 
expect a “Nixon-in-China” effect whereby those with a past of state intervention are 
better able to adopt privatization because voters do not discount their intentions as 
ideologically driven (Cukierman and Tommasi 2001.) 
In short, the broad reach of public utility reform makes it a potentially important 
electoral issue. Moreover, privatization tends to be unpopular and, as a result, its 
adoption is unlikely if incumbents are confronted with small electoral margins and if 
they do not have a large legislative advantage. Having rivals to their left that can provide 
a credible alternative to market-oriented policies makes policy adoption less likely 
whereas a right-wing opposition should make it more likely. The politicization of these 
reforms of broad scope is likely to emerge also through the effect of institutional 
constraints, and in particular, through the effect of ideological distance between the 
incumbent and his or her legislative opposition and the incentives it generates for policy 
conflict and the opportunities it creates for posturing from legislators. 
Since the effect of political competition on policy reform depends on the potential 
impact of policy adoption on the electoral prospects of politicians, we expect that its 
effect will be stronger in electricity than in telecom because potential losses are larger. In 
Latin America, by the mid-1980s, the coverage of electricity was broader than that of 
telecom, at least partially because electricity was considered a necessity and telephone 
connections a luxury given that public telephones could provide service for those without 
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access.12 Indeed, in seven countries surveyed in 1995 the public was more likely to accept 
private provision in telecom than in electricity (Latinobarometro 1995).13 Thus, whereas 
telecom reform involved promising access to a majority of the population for a service for 
which they had no access without risking changes in relative prices, electricity reform 
entailed a threat to subsidized prices enjoyed by large portions of the population —or to 
free access for the portion of the population that was stealing energy. Moreover, because 
exit from the public network is harder in electricity than in telecom, large users are more 
likely to exercise their voice in the former than in the latter. The fact that large users in 
electricity are usually in the traditionally organized industrial sectors furthers this effect. 
As potential losses are more likely to generate mobilization than potential gains, 
electricity reform had a higher potential for politicization, heightening the impact of 
political competition on politicians’ calculation of whether or not to implement reform.14 
In the remainder of the article we will explicitly model the role of political competition 
in policymaking decisions—including both electoral and legislative margins as well as the 
effect of ideology on the incentives and credibility of rivals to oppose market reforms in 
public utilities. In addition, we will also test existing arguments about the effect of 
financial and technological pressures in generating the wave toward market reforms and 
about the role of institutional constraints in providing the opposition with tools to 
obstruct policy adoption. In the next section we describe the empirical indicators we use 
and the modeling strategy we will follow.  
 
                                                 
12 In 1989, when only Chile had privatized both sectors, there were 5 phones per 100 people on average in 
all Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries of Latin America (excluding Cuba) according the the ITU 
whereas the average coverage of electricity was 60% (World Bank 1991).  
13 The countries were Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela and only in 
Argentina more than 50% of the population preferred private provision. 
14 Pierson (1994: 18) explains this effect for social policy based on propensity to risks since individual are 
more risk adverse with respect to gains but risk seeking with respect to losses. 
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| 2 | MODELING POLICY REFORM 
 
n this section we discuss our modeling strategy and the indicators that we use to 
measure the variables presented in the previous section. In the following sections we 
test our expectations about policy reform in all three policies for the two industries, 
electricity and telecom, in eighteen Latin American countries. To do this, we have 
constructed a dataset that covers the years between 1985 and 2000 (observations are 
country-year) and records when the government decided to privatize, open the sector to 
competition and/or establish regulators in each sector. Given our interest in the timing of 
policy adoption, we use duration analysis to explore the factors that affect the probability 
that a country will choose a particular policy, given that it has not done so up to that 
point in time.15 In terms of duration analysis, the individuals in our sample are countries, 
which are observed when they enter the sample (here the entry point is 1985) and are 
observed up to their exit from the sample or failure (in this case, countries fail when they 
decide to adopt a policy).  
Given the nature of our data, and the limitations imposed by the small number of cases, 
we decided to use a Cox proportional hazards model (Cox 1972) instead of more 
restrictive parametric models.16 The choice of this specification allows us to model policy 
reform without having to specify a priori the relationship between the event of interest – 
policy reform – and time.17 Importantly, Cox proportional hazards models assume that 
the relationship between the hazard functions of two countries with a different set of 
covariates are related to each other through a constant. In practice, this is not always the 
case because the effect of some variables on the likelihood that a policy reform will occur 
can change over time and in this sense is non-proportional. In the models we present in 
subsequent sections, we test for proportionality.18 The variables that resulted problematic 
were corrected by adding an interaction with time. In this way, we can estimate the 
direct effect of the explanatory variable (at time = 0) and control for its effect over time 
(see Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001).     
To test our theoretical expectations, we include measures for the five explanatory 
variables derived from our discussion in previous sections: financial and technological 
pressures, institutional constraints, political competition, and ideological legacies. To 
assess the influence of financial pressures on the decision to privatize we focus on the 
availability of foreign capital and on fiscal constraints. We use the size of debt service as a 
proportion of total exports (Debt), the influence of the IMF on countries that have 
                                                 
15 Others have chosen to model the adoption of policy reforms and not their timing, using logit instead of 
duration analysis (see Henizs et al 2005). Duration analysis allows us to explicitly model the process of 
policy convergence that characterized the region and to find the factors that determined differences in the 
pace of policy adoption within this general trend.  
16 Using a parametric model would imply imposing a specific structure on the relationship between time 
and the adoption of policy reform. However, we have no theoretical reason to choose a specific functional 
form (i.e. logistic, exponential, loglogistic, etc.). 
17 We chose to deal with tied failures using the efron method in the calculation of the model given the small 
number of cases and the fact that there were a relatively high number of ties. 
18 We used the stphtest function in stata to test the proportional hazard assumptions. The test is based on 
Schoenfeld residuals and tests the relationship between the residuals and time.  
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subscribed stand-by agreements (Under IMF)19, and the fiscal budget of the government 
(Budget) (see Appendix 1 for a complete list of all the variables and their source). We 
expect the former two to increase the likelihood that reform will take place by imposing 
pressures on capital-scarce countries and the latter to have a negative effect because 
deficits heighten the need for fiscal resources.20 We expect fiscal budgets to have a strong 
effect on privatization, as this policy generates revenue, but not on the other two policies, 
which provide no resources to the Treasury. Instead, foreign investors should care about 
the investment opportunities opened by liberalization and we use Debt as a proxy of their 
influence. Because both industries have high sunk cost that should make investors care 
about regulatory expropriation, we expect foreign investors and international financial 
institutions (using Under IMF as a proxy) to be influential on the establishment of 
regulators (Levy and Spiller 1995). 
We measure technological pressures using Teledensity (number of telephones per 100 
inhabitants) and Electricity Consumption per Capita as they are good approximations of 
the need of reform as a means of catching up technologically and expanding coverage. 
We expect pressure for policy adoption to be inversely related to the density of services in 
each sector. In electricity, economic growth (Growth) should be positively related with 
electricity demand—as it reflects the energy needs of large users.21 We expect 
technological pressures to have a stronger effect on privatization –through residential 
consumers– and on market liberalization –through large users— than on the 
establishment of regulators, which has no immediate effect on energy supply.22 
In assessing the effect of political conditions on policymaking, we use different measures 
of institutional constraints. We use dummies to indicate when the party(ies) in 
government do not hold 50% +1 or more seats in the legislature (Divided Government) 
and when the president’s party does not hold a majority of seats in the legislature 
(Minority President) to test for the effect that the lack of majority support can have on the 
ability of the president to pass policy reforms.23 We also use a measure of the number of 
independent veto points over policy outcomes constructed by Henisz (2004) that takes 
into account the distribution of actors’ preferences as well as the extent of 
                                                 
19 As an alternative measure of financial pressures on Latin American countries, we used an indicator of 
whether a loan from the World Bank was in place. We found this variable to have a significant effect on 
the likelihood of both privatization and the establishment of regulators in telecom. However, we only have 
data for telecom so chose to present results for our IMF indicator throughout in order to allow direct 
comparisons across both sectors. 
20 It is important to note that we have lagged all these variables one year to reflect the assumption that 
financial decisions by the government are made taking into account last year’s resources. 
21 Growth is lagged one year to account for the fact that the government needs time to react to domestic 
policy demands. 
22 Workers of privatized companies also have large stakes in the reform and should influence the 
policymaking process as shown by qualitative studies of privatization in the region (Murillo 2001). 
However, there is no reliable yearly data on unionization either at the sector level or at the national level to 
permit a test of labor influence in our statistical models. 
23 Minority President includes all presidents who’s party does not hold a majority in congress – regardless of 
whether they are part of a legislative coalition or not. Divided Government includes single-party and 
coalition governments that do not have majority support in congress. President Banzer in Bolivia, for 
example, is classified as a minority president because his party’s legislative share was only 25%, but his 
government was not divided because he formed a coalition that reached a legislative share of 74% (see 
Martinez Gallardo 2005). In this way we distinguish between the difficulties associated with not having a 
legislative majority and with having to negotiate with coalition partners to attain this majority support.  
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institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of the president (Political 
Constraints), including the alignment across the executive and legislative branches using 
data on their party composition.  In all cases, we expect a negative relationship between 
institutional constraints and the likelihood of reform. 
We also evaluate the effect of ideological differences between the president and his or her 
opposition on policy conflict or compromise. We measure the ideological distance 
between the president and congress by taking the absolute value of the difference in the 
ideological score of the incumbent and the average of all opposition parties in the 
legislature (weighted by their seat share) (Distance).24 As higher ideological polarization 
augments the incentives for inter-branch conflict and promotes policy obstruction rather 
than compromise by opposing parties, we expect it to have a negative relation to policy 
adoption. 
We measure political competition by assessing the effects of both the electoral margin and 
the legislative advantage of the incumbent, as well as the relative location of the president 
and the opposition in the ideological spectrum. First, we measure political competition 
using the margin (in vote percentage) with which the president won the election to the 
next most voted party (Margin). We also test the effect of the legislative margin of 
maneuver of the president using the difference in the number of seats held by the 
incumbent and by the main opposition parties in the Lower House (Legislative 
Advantage). These variables tap into the incentives that both the competition and the 
incumbent have to support or oppose policies that might represent an electoral risk.  
We then add ideological variables to the measures of political competition. Two 
ideological measures of political competition are of particular interest. First, we include a 
dummy that indicates when the incumbent’s legislative opposition is ideologically 
located to the government’s left (To Left). Second, we include a dummy that indicates 
whether the legislative opposition is located at the extreme right of the ideological 
spectrum, i.e. when it scores, on average (weighted by seat share), more than 4 on our 
ideological scale (Right Opposition). As we have argued, these measures assess the ability 
of the opposition to offer credible alternatives to the incumbent’s policies, especially in 
the context of reforms with electoral effects.  
We expect that presidents who won the election by a larger margin and who govern with 
a larger legislative advantage will be more likely to implement reform. As we have argued, 
larger margins will lower the risk to the incumbent of adopting unpopular policy reforms 
that might imply electoral losses in the future. When the president faces opposition from 
the left, we expect the likelihood of reform to be smaller. By contrast, when the 
opposition is mainly formed of right-wing parties the likelihood that reform will be 
adopted will increase.  
Although we expect politicization of policymaking in both sectors since policy effects are 
important and broad—especially through institutional constraints and ideological 
polarization— political competition should play a stronger role in the privatization of 
electricity than in telecom because this sector is more likely to become electorally 
                                                 
24 All ideological variables are calculated using a 5-point scale, where 1 is the left-most score and 5 is the 
right-most score. Ideological scores are constructed based on Coppedge (1997) and other country-specific 
sources, as well as consultations with country specialists. See Appendix 1 for a complete list of all the 
variables and sources. 
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important. Indeed, the politicization of electricity privatization brought many countries 
to open this industry to private investment before privatizing as an alternative way to 
deal with supply limitations. Mexico is a good example of this strategy as President 
Salinas opened electricity generation by decree in 1992 because privatization would have 
required the involvement of Congress and, in particular, of legislators from the governing 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), who were not favorable to privatization.25 
Finally, to measure the ideological legacies of incumbents, we use a dummy variable to 
measure whether the incumbent party had been involved in the process through which 
the sector was nationalized in the past. Our expectations are positive for privatization and 
for the establishment of regulators as described in the prior section. We include two 
economic control variables: GDP per capita and a dummy for privatization.26 The former 
is lagged one year and controls for the wealth of the country when suffering pressures to 
adopt reforms. The latter is a control variable that assesses whether market liberalization 
and the establishment of regulators were adopted as a result of privatization. We also 
include two political control variables: one takes into account the electoral cycle which 
might affect the president’s incentives to adopt policy reforms, and the other controls for 
the law and order environment, which might play a role in the demand for regulation. 27  
In the following sections we present our results on the hypothesized effects of these 
variables on all three policies in both industries. We restrict our tests of these effects on 
market liberalization to the electricity sector due to data limitations in the area of 
telecoms. But we also include an analysis of the lag between the opening of electricity 
markets to private investment and privatization to assess whether the higher 
politicization of electricity promotes a particular sequencing in policy adoption. 
 
                                                 
25 In a 1995 survey of Mexican legislators, around 60% of PRI legislators expressed a preference for 
privatizing only public services that do not affect many people (Alcántara 1995-2004). The seventy four 
PRI legislators included in the sample belonged to the 1994-1997 Congress that had approved the creation 
of an electricity regulator. When PRI president Ernesto Zedillo proposed electricity privatization to the 
next Congress in 1999, PRI legislators (and even the PRI presidential candidate) failed to support the 
proposal as they feared it would mean risking an electoral defeat in the presidential election the following 
year. This fear was supported by surveys showing that Mexicans considered this issue on their electoral 
calculations in the 2000 presidential election (Magaloni and Poire 2004).  
26 We ran models including inflation because as a control variable because Weyland (2002) and Stallings 
and Peres (2000) argue that high inflation affects the pace of market reforms in general, but failed to 
achieve robust results and do not include them in this article. 
27 Arguments about the diffusion of policy reform are hard to test in the context of the type of empirical 
analysis we use here. Others have used the number of previous privatizations in the region (see Kogut and 
Macpherson 2004, Henisz et al 2005, Levi-Faur 1999, 2004) as an indicator of the declining cost of 
privatizing as others adopt (and test) the reforms. By using event history analysis we model the dynamic 
aspect of reform – the factors that affect whether a country is an innovator or a follower – but we do not 
include the number of previous privatizations in the region because this variable is perfectly collinear with 
the country variable, i.e. the variable takes the same value for every country for each year, and we cannot 
estimate hazard rates for this indicator. See Meseguer and Gilardi (2005) on the issues involved in 
measuring diffusion. We also used Lora’s (2001) index of structural reforms as a control. The index 
measures the extent to which market reforms in several areas had been put in place in each country, each 
year providing a way to assess whether there was some diffusion effect stemming from financial pressures. 
However, we chose not to include it in the models presented here because it is not significant for telecom 
and it is highly collinear with some of our indicators in the electricity regressions, artificially inflating the 
significance of our results. 
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| 3 | PRIVATIZATION OF TELECOM AND ELECTRICITY 
 
n this section we analyze the conditions that influence the adoption of privatization 
in both sectors. In the following paragraphs we present results for models that 
include measures of financial pressures and technological pressures for policy 
adoption and institutional constraints on policymaking. Importantly, we include 
indicators of political competition to test the arguments we have laid out about the effect 
of political competition on the incentives to privatize, especially in the electricity sector 
where we expect stronger effects than in telecom.  
Table 1 shows the relevant dates for privatization adoption in each country including 
both the year when privatization was approved and the year when the actual sale of assets 
began. We are particularly interested in the political decision to adopt privatization 
rather than the actual sale of assets, which is affected by available capital and technical 
issues. Consequently, for both sectors, we focus on the group of countries that had 
decided to privatize by the end of 2000, even if they were still in the process of 
implementing the sale of assets.  
 
Telecom 
Our findings give partial support to our expectations. As shown in Table 2, financial 
pressures have the expected effect on the privatization of telecoms. Although the effect of 
external debt service is not significant and the positive effect of, being under an IMF 
agreement is not robust across all model specifications, the indicator of World Bank 
telecom loans is significant for all specifications of the model. The hazard rate indicates 
that where such a loan is in place countries are between 4 and 6 times more likely to 
adopt privatization. More importantly, as suggested by the literature, fiscal deficits do 
influence the decision to sell public assets in the expected direction. The fiscal budget has 
a negative and significant effect: an increase of one point in the size of the deficit as a 
percentage of GDP decreases the probability of adopting privatization by around 16%.  
 
******* TABLE 2 HERE  ******* 
 
The effect of teledensity (the number of telephones per 1000 inhabitants) is non-
proportional. It has a significant and negative effect on the privatization when an 
interaction with time is not included. However, when we control for time, a higher 
teledensity is associated with an increase of 11-14% in the likelihood of privatization at 
the outset of the period, but this effect becomes significant and negative as time goes by 
(see Figure 1). This effect suggests that technological pressures hit first the countries with 
a higher teledensity and, as their example takes on, the less developed countries are more 
likely to reform in order to catch up. GDP per capita has a similar effect as it is positive 
at the beginning of the period but becomes significantly negative with time.  
The Henisz’s index of institutional constraints has no significant effects and divided 
governments and minority presidents are no less likely to privatize than presidents whose 
I 
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party has a legislative majority or unified governments. Yet, the ideological distance 
between the executive and the legislature, which increases the incentives for the legislative 
opposition to obstruct policy adoption, has a significant effect. This effect is rather 
substantial: broadening the distance between the president and the legislature by one-
point (on a 5-point scale) translates into a decrease of over 40% in the probability of 
reform. We do not find significant effects for any indicator of political competition, but 
find strong evidence for a “Nixon-in-China” effect in the privatization of telecom: parties 
with ideological legacies of state intervention are substantially more likely to adopt this 
policy.  
In sum, we find that fiscal deficits accelerate telecom privatization whereas teledensity 
affects the decision to privatize in a non-proportional way. As expected, we find that the 
politicization of policy reform in this sector was limited, as institutional constraints and 
political competition had practically no effect on the decision to privatize telecom. We 
did find, however, that the ideological distance between the president and congress 
delays policy adoption. We also find support for a Nixon-in-China effect as parties with 
a nationalizing past are more likely to privatize. 
 
Electricity 
As in telecom, we find some evidence of financial pressures. Although neither being 
under an IMF agreement, nor the size of the external service affect the decision to 
privatize electricity, as in telecom, fiscal deficits do matter. Fiscal budgets have a 
significant negative effect on the decision to privatize electricity and an increase of one 
percent in the budget decreases the likelihood of policy adoption by 15%.  
 
*** TABLE 3 HERE *** 
 
We also find that electricity consumption per capita has a significant negative effect on 
the likelihood of privatization. However, as teledensity for telecom privatization, this 
effect is non-proportional. The direct effect of electricity consumption over the 
likelihood of privatization is positive, however, this effect becomes significant and 
negative, indicating that after 1992 a higher level of consumption translated into a 
smaller likelihood that privatization would occur (see Figure 2).28 As in telecom, it seems 
that countries with higher per capita consumption were more likely to adopt 
privatization at the start of the period, but later in the period poorer countries were more 
likely to do it in an effort to catch up. The effect of economic growth (our proxy for 
electricity demand by large users) also changes over time—it is negative at t=0 but its 
interaction with time has a positive effect—and its significance varies somewhat with 
model specification, thereby making it hard to precise the rate at which the effect 
decreases. 
We find some evidence that institutional constraints affect privatization in electricity. 
Neither divided governments nor minority presidents were any less likely to privatize. 
Yet, Henisz’s political constraints index has a significant effect on predicting the approval 
                                                 
28 We also used electricity losses as an alternative measure, but its effect was not significant. 
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of privatization laws—an increase of one standard deviation (.23) in the 0-1 scale reduces 
the likelihood of adopting privatization in 45%. The ideological distance between the 
executive and the legislature has a negative effect as an increase of one point in the 
ideological distance between the executive and the legislature also reduces the likelihood 
of privatization by around 45%.29 Our measures of political competition provide 
evidence of the somewhat higher politicization of this sector when compared with 
telecom. The president’s legislative advantage has a positive effect: an increase of one 
standard deviation (65 legislative seats) in the president’s legislative advantage makes the 
government nearly twice as likely to pass a privatization law. Thus, a larger legislative 
advantage increases the incumbent’s capacity to get laws approved and reduces the risks 
of political competition from its main legislative challengers.30 Finally, in contrast with 
telecom, we find no increase in the likelihood of reform for political parties that 
participated in nationalizing the state enterprise in this sector. 
To summarize our results for the adoption of privatization, we find, in consonance with 
the literature on privatization in the region, that larger fiscal deficits increase the 
likelihood of privatization in both sectors. This finding also lends support to the idea 
that privatization was driven by pragmatism rather than by sheer ideological conviction. 
The increase in the likelihood of privatization when the incumbent belonged to a party 
that had been involved in the nationalization of the sector confirms this pragmatism, 
albeit only in telecom. We find non-proportional effects for teledensity and electricity 
consumption that suggest that technological pressures hit the richer countries first and 
then the poorer ones. We find support for our expectations regarding inter-industry 
differences based on political effects. Formal institutional constraints only have a weak 
effect on the privatization of electricity and none in telecom. Indicators of political 
competition have a somewhat stronger effect on the privatization of electricity than on 
telecom.  
 
                                                 
29 As we explained before, to calculate ideological distance we take the absolute value of the difference in 
the ideological score of the president (or parties in government) and the opposition parties in the 
legislature. This variable measures polarization, and not the relative position of parties. If, for example, the 
incumbent is from a right-wing party with a score of, say, 4.5, and the main opposition parties in the 
legislature average a score of 3, the distance is of 1.5. The measure of ideological distance would be the 
same if the scores for the executive and the legislature were reverted. 
30 Although the existence of a right-wing opposition was not significant for countries that had passed a 
privatization law, the sale of assets in electricity was made significantly (and substantively) more likely by a 
legislative opposition that was right-wing.  
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| 4 | MARKET LIBERALIZATION  
 
n our quantitative analysis, we are limited to studying the liberalization of electricity 
market to private investment. In telecom, market liberalization was often scheduled 
at the time of privatization as many countries adopted legal monopolies to increase 
the value of their assets and to smooth the ending of cross-subsidies. If the sale of assets 
includes a scheduled timeline for opening to competition, it is impossible to relate the 
conditions of that year with the policy decision taken at the time of telecom 
privatization. Hence, we only model the adoption of market liberalization to private 
investment in electricity, using hazard models to estimate the factors that affect the 
likelihood that a country will adopt this policy. We use the same measures of financial 
and technological pressures, institutional constraints and political competition that we 
used in the previous section. 
We found limited evidence that financial pressures were influential in the decision to 
open electricity markets to private investment (see Table 4A). Being under an IMF 
agreement had no effect, and neither did the fiscal deficit as no fiscal resources were 
generated through this policy. Yet, the size of the external debt did have a significant and 
positive effect, suggesting that foreign investors were pressing for investment 
opportunities in this area. An increase in the level of external debt of one standard 
deviation translated into an increase in the hazard of opening the industry to private 
capital of around 80%.  
Although per capita electricity consumption did not have a robust effect,31 GDP per 
capita did increase the likelihood of competition significantly – an increase of one 
standard deviation in the level of GDP per capita of a country translated into an increase 
of around 80% in the likelihood of reform. Furthermore, economic growth had a 
significant positive effect, suggesting that electricity demand from large users rather than 
from residential consumers was influential in the opening to private investment in 
electricity. This effect was substantively large: a one-point increase in a country’s growth 
rate made the odds of adopting this reform around 50% larger.  
 
****** TABLE 4A HERE ******* 
 
Whereas the political constraints index, divided government, and minority president had 
no effect on the adoption of this policy, the ideological distance between the executive 
and the legislative had a significant negative effect. An additional point of ideological 
distance between the executive and the legislature (Distance) decreased the probability of 
reform adoption by around 50%. In terms of political competition, the president’s 
electoral margin and the executive’s advantage in legislative seats had significant effects in 
the expected direction. An increase of one standard deviation in the president’s electoral 
margin translates into an increase of 1.8 in the odds of opening the market to private 
investment. An increase in one standard deviation (65 seats) in the advantage for the 
                                                 
31 Like before, electricity losses had no effect so it is not included in the regressions. 
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incumbent in legislative seats (Legislative Advantage) made the reform nearly twice as 
likely. However, the ideology of the opposition did not have a significant effect.   
In many cases, the decision to open the electricity sector to private investment is the 
result of domestic pressures to increase the energy supply—as indicated by the effect of 
lagged growth on this decision—when governments have not adopted privatization. 
Because electricity privatization has the potential to cause electoral costs when political 
competition is high, we expect that the lag between the decision to open the market to 
private investment and the decision to privatize will capture, at least partly, the sort of 
politicization that prevented governments from privatizing the sector in the first place 
(Table 4B). Therefore, we analyze the decision to privatize electricity given than this 
industry had already been opened to private investment. Because in electricity the 
decision to privatize came in almost all the cases in our sample after (or simultaneous 
with) the decision to open the market to private investment (see Table 1 for dates), we 
can use duration analysis to relate a set of independent variables with the lag between 
policy decisions in this sector.32 As governments signaled their reformist decision by 
opening electricity to private investment, we expect that privatization will be delayed (the 
lag between policy decisions will be larger) when political competition is high and 
increases the electoral risks for the reformist administration. 
As expected, we find that the decision to privatize, given that electricity markets had been 
opened to private investment, is highly politicized as all four indicators of political 
competition had significant effects in the expected direction. By contrast, none of the 
three indicators of financial pressures had an effect. Electricity consumption per capita 
has a negative effect, but it is not robust across model specifications.33  Lagged growth, 
however, has a significant positive effect suggesting that the same domestic pressures that 
prompted governments to allow private investment for energy supply were at work in the 
decision to continue the reform path toward privatization. This effect is substantively 
very large:  a standard deviation increase in the rate of growth raises the odds of reform 
around 6 times, although the size of this effect varies with the inclusion of different 
variables. 
 
********** TABLE 4B HERE*********** 
 
The significance of political competition provides evidence that the timing of the 
government’s policy decisions was to a large extent driven by the fear that adopting 
privatization might be politically risky. We found a significant decline in the probability 
that privatization will happen if the legislative opposition is to the left of the incumbent 
(90%), and a substantial increase in this probability when the margin of victory for the 
incumbent is larger and when his/her legislative advantage increases. Noticeably, a right-
wing opposition makes privatization more than 5 times as likely. Thus, higher political 
                                                 
32 To analyze the lag between policy decisions we dropped all country-years before the market was opened 
to private capital, leaving only countries that adopted this policy. We then observe these countries until 
they privatize or until the end of the period if privatization of electricity was not adopted. Countries 
excluded are Chile (opened to private investment in 1982), Honduras and Paraguay. 
33 Using electricity losses as an alternative measure does not provide better results. 
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competition delays privatization in electricity when the industry has already opened to 
private investment.  
Other political conditions also affect the politicization of the policymaking process. An 
increase of one point in the ideological distance between the executive and the legislature 
delays privatization in over 50%. All three indicators of institutional constraints also 
increase significantly the lag between opening to competition and privatizing. A one 
standard deviation in the Henisz’s index decreases the likelihood of reform by 70%, a 
change from unified to divided government decreases this likelihood in 93%, and a 
change from majority to minority president translates into a drop of 94% in the 
probability of reform. Furthermore, we find that the electoral cycle has a significant 
effect on this decision: after the market has been opened to private capital, presidents are 
more likely to privatize when they are further along in their term. The nationalization 
legacy of the incumbent, though, has no effect. 
In short, the opening of electricity markets to private investment seems to be associated 
with the pressures of foreign investors and the demands of large users. The politicization 
of electricity also affected this reform as shown by our results on political competition 
indicators. The effect of political competition was even stronger for cases in which the 
market was opened to private capital before privatization was implemented, suggesting 
that this reform path was a response to the political context that surrounded reforms in 
the electricity sector. Our analysis of the lag between opening to private capital and 
privatization shows that the influence of political conditions—either political 
competition, ideological polarization, or institutional constraints—was stronger for this 
set of cases than it was for any of the other reforms and had the expected effect of making 
privatization harder for reformist governments that had already opened the market to 
private investment. For these cases, privatization was adopted as a second stage in the 
reform of the sector when energy demands continued to grow and when political 
conditions did not hinder the process. 
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| 5 | THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES 
 
n this section, we test the conditions that affect the establishment of regulatory 
authorities. Although we do not expect fiscal budgets to have an effect on the 
decision to establish regulatory authorities because they generate no resources, we do 
expect other measures of financial pressure to have an effect. We also expect weak effects 
from technological pressures given that regulatory authorities do not have an immediate 
impact on supply. Further, in contrast to privatization and market liberalization, this 
policy gives politicians with stronger preferences for state regulation—assumed by their 
past promotion of state intervention in these industries—a policy option that implies re-
regulation. We thereby expect that incumbents with a nationalistic past are more likely 
to adopt this policy.  
We use hazard models to estimate the factors that affect the likelihood that a country will 
establish a regulator, and we relate this probability to the measures of financial and 
technological pressures, institutional constraints and political competition that we have 
used in the previous sections. We present the findings for telecoms first, followed by the 
results for electricity. 
 
Telecom 
Our findings show that financial pressures have weak effects on the establishment of 
regulatory agencies in telecom. Neither the fiscal deficit nor the level of external debt had 
a significant effect. Moreover, the effect of being under an IMF agreement is not robust 
(see Table 5). However, the indicator of whether a World Bank loan was in effect in the 
country that year is significant across all specifications of the model. Teledensity has a 
significant effect on the establishment of regulators in the sector, but this effect is 
strongly non-proportional. Although teledensity has a negative effect when included 
alone in the model, when we also include an interaction with time its effect is positive at 
the beginning of the period and after 1992-1993 becomes significant and negative (see 
Figure 3).  
 
***** TABLE 5 HERE ***** 
 
Neither of our indicators of institutional constraints (Political Constraints, Divided 
Government, and Minority President) had an effect on this policy reform. Yet, the 
ideological distance between the president and the legislature have a significant negative 
effect, reducing the probability that a regulatory agency would be established in this 
sector by nearly 45% for each additional point of distance. None of our indicators of 
political competition has a significant effect. Finally, we do find evidence of 
nationalization legacies. Incumbent parties that nationalized public companies in the 
telecommunications sector are more than five times more likely to establish a regulatory 
agency than other parties. That is, parties with a past of state intervention are likely to 





Our results regarding the establishment of regulatory agencies in electricity suggest that 
technological pressures played practically no role in this policy decision, although 
financial pressures did have some effect. The indicator of whether the country was under 
an IMF agreement has a positive and significant effect (see Table 6). Countries under 
IMF agreements were around 3 times more likely than other countries to create 
regulatory agencies. The size of the external debt also had a positive effect on the 
likelihood of establishing a regulatory agency. As in telecom, the fiscal deficit had no 
significant effect on the establishment of regulatory agencies, which provide no fiscal 
revenue to the government.  
 
****** TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE****** 
 
Of our measures of institutional constraints, the Henisz’ index and minority presidents 
did have a significant, negative effect on the establishment of regulators in the electricity 
sector in the region. These effects are substantively important: countries with minority 
presidents are 72% less likely to establish a regulator, and an increase of one standard 
deviation in the political constraints index reduces the likelihood of policy adoption in 
47%. Similarly, the ideological distance between the government and the legislative 
opposition has a significant negative effect on the establishment of regulators, with a 
reduction of 55% in the odds of reform for each additional ideological point in distance. 
In term of political competition, there is a significant effect on policy adoption when the 
opposition is to the left of the incumbent (To Left). Indeed, this variable makes policy 
adoption nearly 60% less likely.  
To sum up, our empirical analysis shows that the difference in the politicization of the 
two sectors that we noticed for privatization also emerges for the establishment of 
regulatory authorities. The more significant effects of political competition in electricity 
than in telecom are evidence of this difference, although the potential politicization of 
both sectors is shown in the effect of ideological polarization between the incumbent and 
the opposition in both sectors. In contrast to privatization, fiscal deficits have no effect 
on the establishment of regulators, which do not generate revenue. The role of 
international financial institutions and foreign investors on the establishment of 
regulators—which affect the risk of expropriation— seems to be more robust in 
electricity. We do not find a robust effect of IMF agreements on reform in telecom, but 
we do find that World Bank loans have the effect of increasing the likelihood that the 
privatization and the establishment of regulators will be implemented. Also, while 
teledensity and electricity consumption play a role in the adoption of privatization, they 
are not determinant in the adoption of regulators, which has no effect on the supply of 
services. Finally, legacies of state intervention, which we expected to promote the 
adoption of regulators, only had the expected effect in the telecom sector. 
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| 6 | CONCLUSION 
 
This article demonstrates the effect of political competition in shaping the incentives that 
policymakers have to respond to technological and financial pressures by adopting 
market reforms in telecom and electricity in Latin America. It emphasizes the incentives 
faced by incumbents and their political challengers derived from their power differential 
in votes and seats, as well as their relative ideological positions. Electoral margins affect 
the electoral risk of policy adoption for incumbents whereas the size of their legislative 
advantage shapes their capacity to adopt their desired policy and the dangers associated 
with policy defeat. The relative ideological position of the incumbent and the opposition 
influence the credibility of policy alternatives and the likelihood that disaffected voters 
will react to market reforms by defecting to the opposition. Similarly, the potential for 
policy polarization is measured by the ideological distance between the executive and the 
legislative opposition, which affects the incentives of the opposition for policy 
obstruction rather than compromise through coalition building.  
By comparing across countries and across sectors, we are able to find systematic 
differences in the conditions under which adoption of policy reform took place in 
electricity and telecom.  While inter-industry patterns of policy adoption have been 
noticed before (Levi-Faur 1999, 2004), they have typically been associated to 
technological differences (Bartle 2002). We argue that these inter-industry differences 
also result from political differences between both sectors. Electric energy is more 
politicized than telecom as its coverage is broader—expanding the costs of reforms across 
more consumers who may stand to lose their subsidies. Additionally, energy has an 
important symbolic value in Latin America, making it a politically sensitive issue. As a 
result, indicators of political competition have a stronger effect in this sector than in 
telecom reforms—especially numerical indicators of vote and seat differentials that are 
never significant in telecom. Here we have provided evidence that one way in which 
incumbents have faced the political challenge of reforming the electricity sector has been 
through a two-stage reform, opening to private investment before privatizing. Finally, 
legacies of state intervention are important in both the establishment of regulators and 
privatization in telecom, but they play no role in electricity.  
Our results also show patterns along policy dimensions. Fiscal deficits only influence the 
adoption of privatization, which is the only policy that produces revenues. Teledensity 
and electricity consumption per capita also have a stronger effect on privatization than 
on the establishment of regulatory frameworks. Both variables have non-proportional 
effects on the probability that privatization will be adopted, suggesting that richer 
countries were more likely to try this experiment at the beginning of the period, with 
poorer countries becoming more committed to reform as time went by.  Private investors 
and large users, who had larger stakes in the process, were more instrumental in the 
opening of electricity to private investment than in telecom where large users can more 
easily bypass the public network. Technological pressures, however, have practically no 
effect on the establishment of regulatory authorities since this policy represents no 
immediate impact on supply. By contrast, financial pressures other than fiscal deficits 
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seem to be somewhat more important for the establishment of regulatory agencies than 
in the decision to privatize public utilities.34 
This article makes two main contributions to the literature on policymaking. First, we 
emphasize the importance of political competition on policymaking in a context of 
strong technological and financial pressures for policy adoption. Our findings show the 
importance of political competition, focusing particularly on two dimensions: the 
political incentives faced by the incumbent (determined by the difference in votes and 
seats between the president and its main challengers) and the viability of using policy 
obstruction as an electoral banner (which depends on the credibility of policy alternatives 
as defined by the relative ideological position of the incumbent and the opposition). 
Previous literature has shown the connection between domestic politics and the policy 
process, but it has mainly focused on the effects of institutional constraints on 
policymaking. Instead, we emphasize the effects of political competition on policy 
adoption—and the incentives to form potential policy coalitions generated by ideological 
polarization—even when technological and financial pressures are forcing governments 
of different ideologies to implement the same policies in the region.  
Second, we stress the importance of disaggregating the analysis of market reforms in 
order to better understand different patterns of policymaking in the context of policy 
convergence generated by technological and financial pressures. The study of market 
reforms in Latin America has moved from a first generation of work that focused on the 
feasibility of market reforms in general to a second generation that looks more carefully 
at the dynamics of each reform. In this article we use duration analysis to study the 
conditions under which different policy reforms were adopted across countries and across 
two industries. This strategy allows us to identify systematic inter-industry and inter-
policy differences in policymaking. The findings presented here should be tested in other 
sectors and regions to confirm their generalizability. 
One important limitation of our analysis is that by studying policy adoption –or what 
Kaufman and Nelson (2004) call “authorization”— we have ignored variation in the 
implementation of the same policy following the initial decision to adopt it. Although 
the actual implementation of these reforms tends to be very technical and has a much 
lower potential to become electorally salient, the political conditions affecting these 
technical choices is an avenue of research that promises to further add to our 
understanding of policymaking under technological and financial pressures. Indeed, the 
lower visibility of policy implementation—as opposed to adoption—might provide a 
crucial tool for understanding the limits of political competition and the weight of 
political conditions in shaping policymaking in two sectors that provide crucial 
infrastructure and essential public services.  
                                                 
34 This is true as well when we use our indicator of World Bank loans in electricity. Although the variable is 
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Table 1: Public Utility Reform in Latin America 
 




















Argentina 1991 1990 1990 1990 1992 1990 1992 2000 2000 
Bolivia 1994 1994 1995 1994 1995 1994 1994 2001 2001 
Brazil 1996 1997 1998 1997 1995 1995 1995 1999 1999 
Chile 1978/19851 1977/1982 1986 1982 1986 1982 1982 1982 1994 
Colombia 1994 1994 . 1994 1996 1994 1991 1998 1997 
Costa Rica 1996 1996 . . . . 1998 . . 
Dominican Republic 1999 1998 1931 19312 1999 1997 1999 1990 1990 
Ecuador 1996 1992 . 1992 . 2000 1998 2002 2002 
El Salvador 1996 1996 1998 1996 1998 1996 1998 1996 1996 
Guatemala 1996 1996 1998 1996 1997 1996 1996 1998 1998 
Honduras 1994 1995 . 1995 . 1994 . .3 . 
Mexico 1995 1995 1990 1989 . . 1992 1997 1997 
Nicaragua 1994 1995 2001 1995 2000 1998 1997 20054 2005 
Panama 1996 1996 1997 1996 1998 1997 1998 2003 1996 
Paraguay . 1995 . 1995 . 2000 . . . 
Peru 1996 1993 1994 1993 1994 1992 1994 1999 1999 
Uruguay 1997 2001 . 2001 . . 1997 . . 
Venezuela 1992 1991 1991 1991 . 2001 1996 2000 2000 
 
 
Table 2. Privatization Telecom (Adoption of Privatization Law)* 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Under IMF 2.354  2.093 1.457 2.592 2.530 2.626 2.637 5.085 2.318 6.020 2.628 
 (1.62)  (1.17) (0.87) (1.80)* (1.63) (1.64) (1.78)* (2.15)** (1.42) (3.99)*** (1.67)* 
WB Loans  4.175           
  (2.47)**           
Debt 1.005 1.177 1.148 1.000 1.066 1.038 1.058 1.051 1.080 1.126 0.759 1.052 
 (0.56) (1.06) (1.11) (0.06) (0.48) (0.21) (0.38) (0.31) (0.52) (0.69) (2.00)** (0.32) 
Debt * LogT  0.926 0.934  0.968 0.982 0.973 0.975 0.964 0.943 1.140 0.976 
  (1.06) (1.13)  (0.51) (0.21) (0.39) (0.32) (0.52) (0.72) (1.91)* (0.32) 
Budget   0.862          
   (1.77)*          
Tele Density 0.989 1.112 1.152  1.140 1.134 1.131 1.130 1.135 1.130 1.123 1.132 
 (1.68)* (1.76)* (3.88)***  (2.94)*** (2.84)*** (3.41)*** (3.25)*** (3.34)*** (3.17)*** (2.76)*** (3.30)*** 
Tele Density * LogT  0.950 0.935  0.938 0.941 0.943 0.942 0.941 0.942 0.936 0.942 
  (2.06)** (4.34)***  (3.28)*** (3.25)*** (3.73)*** (3.82)*** (3.74)*** (3.87)*** (3.72)*** (3.85)*** 
GDP per Capita    1.004         
    (2.20)**         
GDP * LogT    0.998         
    (2.38)**         
Growth 0.922 1.743 1.831 1.662 1.388 1.429 1.331 1.373 1.147 1.438 1.251 1.385 
 (1.23) (1.19) (2.72)*** (1.36) (0.96) (1.00) (0.93) (0.86) (0.41) (1.04) (0.56) (1.04) 
Growth * LogT  0.691 0.708 0.756 0.800 0.794 0.825 0.811 0.880 0.787 0.876 0.807 
  (1.69)* (2.96)*** (1.68)* (1.35) (1.33) (1.26) (1.07) (0.75) (1.34) (0.71) (1.37) 
Political Constraints     3.116        
     (0.80)        
Divided Government      1.149       
      (0.19)       
Minority President       0.836      
       (0.23)      
Distance         0.598    
         (2.06)**    
Margin        0.540     
        (0.31)     
To Left        1.201     
        (0.28)     
Legislative Advantage          1.001   
          (0.24)   
Right Opposition          0.605   
          (0.96)   
Electoral Cycle            0.956 
            (0.29) 
Nationalizing Party (in Telecom)           18.639  
           (3.13)***  
Observations 153 151 150 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
* Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Regressions exclude Chile, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, all of which had 
approved privatization laws by 1985, when our dataset begins. 
 
 
Table 3. Privatization Electricity (Adoption of Privatization Law)* 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Under IMF 0.541 0.420 0.709 0.556 0.672 0.468 1.038 0.534 0.650 0.584 0.485 
 (1.26) (1.39) (0.63) (1.22) (0.59) (1.08) (0.06) (1.10) (0.70) (1.19) (1.09) 
Debt 1.011 1.007 1.010 1.012 1.008 1.015 1.016 1.015 1.011 1.012 1.012 
 (0.86) (0.53) (0.75) (0.92) (0.78) (1.15) (1.09) (1.09) (0.95) (0.94) (0.92) 
Budget  0.851          
  (1.88)*          
Electricity Consumption 0.999 1.010  1.011 1.008 1.009 1.008 1.008 1.007 1.008 1.009 
 (2.13)** (2.64)***  (3.34)*** (2.36)** (2.07)** (2.38)** (2.04)** (2.11)** (2.19)** (2.21)** 
Electricity Consumption * LogT  0.995  0.995 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 
  (2.76)***  (3.43)*** (2.49)** (2.12)** (2.65)*** (2.21)** (2.44)** (2.29)** (2.33)** 
GDP per Capita   1.000         
   (1.14)         
Growth 0.984 0.740 0.597 0.559 0.520 0.557 0.351 0.486 0.445 0.507 0.584 
 (0.19) (0.91) (1.44) (1.84)* (1.85)* (1.99)** (3.17)*** (2.17)** (2.15)** (2.50)** (1.67)* 
Growth * LogT  1.126 1.240 1.300 1.328 1.303 1.616 1.381 1.424 1.349 1.273 
  (0.79) (1.39) (2.03)** (1.90)* (2.06)** (3.31)*** (2.23)** (2.16)** (2.41)** (1.81)* 
Political Constraints    0.073        
    (2.09)**        
Divided Government     0.553       
     (1.00)       
Minority President      1.359      
      (0.46)      
Distance        0.550     
       (3.75)***     
Margin / SD(Margin)5        1.725    
        (1.15)    
To Left        0.528    
        (1.09)    
Legislative Advantage         1.009   
         (1.85)*   
Right Opposition         2.563   
         (0.98)   
Electoral Cycle          0.728  
          (1.54)  
Nationalizing Party (in Electricity)           0.785 
           (0.38) 
Observations 215 212 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
* Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Regressions exclude Chile, which had already approved a privatization law by 1985, 
when our dataset begins. 
 
 
Table 4A. Decision to Open Up to Private Capital* 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Under IMF 1.310 1.320 1.304 1.312 1.433 1.149 1.297 2.265 1.664 1.265 1.543 
 (0.46) (0.50) (0.45) (0.40) (0.62) (0.23) (0.43) (1.26) (0.58) (0.34) (0.67) 
Debt 1.039 1.042 1.043 1.039 1.036 1.039 1.036 1.044 1.040 1.044 1.039 
 (2.22)** (2.24)** (1.99)** (2.34)** (2.12)** (2.30)** (1.77)* (2.69)*** (2.42)** (2.29)** (2.13)** 
Budget   1.080          
  (0.66)          
Electricity Consumption 0.995 0.994  0.995 0.995 0.995 0.994 0.994 0.992 0.994 0.995 
 (1.34) (1.26)  (1.36) (1.30) (1.15) (1.29) (1.30) (1.70)* (1.45) (1.18) 
Electricity Consumption * LogT 1.002 1.003  1.002 1.003 1.002 1.003 1.003 1.004 1.003 1.002 
 (1.52) (1.40)  (1.54) (1.48) (1.35) (1.44) (1.39) (1.75)* (1.72)* (1.34) 
GDP per Capita/ SD(GDP per Capita)6   1.798         
   (2.16)**         
Growth 1.478 1.485 1.380 1.478 1.493 1.496 1.502 1.520 1.600 1.546 1.482 
 (2.79)*** (2.81)*** (2.30)** (2.96)*** (3.25)*** (2.89)*** (3.39)*** (3.00)*** (3.88)*** (2.51)** (2.68)*** 
Political Constraints       0.233      
      (0.87)      
Divided Government     0.672       
     (0.60)       
Minority President       0.645     
       (0.40)     
Distance        0.516    
        (2.03)**    
Margin / SD(Margin)7          1.851  
          (2.58)***  
To Left          0.946  
          (0.08)  
Legislative Advantage         1.011   
         (2.94)***   
Right Opposition         1.861   
         (0.50)   
Electoral Cycle           0.897 
           (0.53) 
Nationalizing Party (in Electricity)    0.992        
    (0.01)        
Observations 207 204 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 206 207 
* Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Regressions exclude Chile, which had opened the electricity market to private 
competition since 1982.           
 
Table 4B. Lag Between Opening to Private Capital and Privatization* 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Under IMF 1.363 1.148 2.421 1.498 0.952 1.241 1.068 2.611 4.672 1.389 0.578 0.542 
 (0.45) (0.18) (1.10) (0.54) (0.06) (0.30) (0.08) (0.89) (1.62) (0.39) (0.75) (0.71) 
Debt 1.035 1.048 1.053 1.051 1.055 1.044 1.065 1.032 1.065 1.052 1.049 1.073 
 (1.57) (1.34) (1.49) (1.62) (1.35) (1.28) (1.83)* (0.75) (1.57) (0.85) (1.33) (2.11)** 
Debt * LogT  1.017 1.019 0.983 1.006 1.009 1.029 1.011  1.018 1.058 1.023 
  (1.17) (1.28) (0.73) (0.29) (0.53) (1.20) (0.59)  (0.67) (1.89)* (1.29) 
Budget   1.307          
   (1.43)          
Electricity Consumption 0.999 1.000 0.999  0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 
 (1.72)* (0.55) (0.99)  (0.83) (1.43) (0.15) (0.17) (1.15) (1.62) (0.46) (0.44) 
Electricity Consumption * LogT  0.999 0.999  0.999 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.998 
  (1.99)** (1.56)  (1.74)* (1.95)* (2.39)** (1.92)* (1.19) (1.13) (2.89)*** (2.36)** 
GDP per Capita    1.000         
    (0.95)         
Growth 1.543 1.514 1.657 1.560 1.567 1.961 1.706 1.746 1.825 1.829 2.233 1.435 
 (3.22)*** (2.83)*** (2.90)*** (2.80)*** (2.72)*** (2.89)*** (3.19)*** (4.09)*** (3.30)*** (3.77)*** (3.12)*** (1.88)* 
Political Constraints       0.001      
       (2.54)**      
Divided Government      0.068       
      (3.18)***       
Minority President        0.062     
        (2.06)**     
Distance         0.543    
         (2.32)**    
Distance * LogT         0.731    
         (0.91)    
Margin / SD(Margin)8           12.995  
           (3.54)***  
To Left           0.102  
           (2.28)**  
Legislative Advantage          1.013   
          (2.43)**   
Legislative Advantage * LogT          1.004   
          (0.27)   
Right Opposition          5.757   
          (1.90)*   
Electoral Cycle            1.788 
            (2.67)*** 
Nationalizing Party (in Electricity)     2.099        
     (0.60)        
Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
* Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Regressions include only countries that opened to competition after 1985 and thus excludes Honduras and Paraguay (did not open to private capital) and Chile, which opened before 1985. 
  
             
 
Table 5. Regulatory Agency Telecom* 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Under IMF 2.559  3.118 2.971 1.763 3.243 2.768 3.130 6.949 2.924 3.174 3.120 3.984 
 (1.73)*  (1.79)* (1.75)* (1.41) (1.91)* (1.72)* (1.84)* (2.13)** (1.84)* (1.64) (1.86)* (3.33)*** 
WB Loans  7.181            
  (3.40)***            
Debt 1.007 1.006 1.010 1.007 1.011 1.009 1.015 1.009 1.009 1.010 1.008 1.009 1.012 
 (0.73) (0.49) (0.93) (0.68) (1.07) (0.86) (1.39) (0.91) (0.91) (1.01) (0.78) (0.96) (1.01) 
Budget    0.958          
    (0.51)          
Tele Density 0.987 1.163 1.133 1.141  1.140 1.156 1.137 1.154 1.141 1.137 1.142 1.125 
 (2.29)** (2.98)*** (3.40)*** (3.64)***  (3.72)*** (4.16)*** (3.91)*** (3.99)*** (4.00)*** (3.70)*** (2.78)*** (3.43)*** 
Tele Density * LogT  0.936 0.944 0.941  0.941 0.936 0.942 0.936 0.941 0.942 0.941 0.940 
  (3.11)*** (3.85)*** (4.19)***  (4.35)*** (4.67)*** (4.59)*** (4.56)*** (4.64)*** (4.37)*** (3.25)*** (4.46)*** 
GDP per Capita     1.000         
     (1.37)         
Growth 0.898 0.780 0.883 0.875 0.906 0.869 0.864 0.876 0.872 0.880 0.873 0.874 0.883 
 (1.32) (1.85)* (1.36) (1.62) (1.19) (1.67)* (1.62) (1.62) (1.70)* (1.40) (1.60) (1.57) (1.65)* 
Privatization of Electricity   1.326           
   (0.38)           
Political Constraints      1.921        
      (0.61)        
Divided Government       1.689       
       (1.08)       
Minority President        0.914      
        (0.15)      
Distance         0.548     
         (3.15)***     
Margin          2.019    
          (0.38)    
To Left          0.630    
          (0.69)    
Legislative Advantage           1.001   
           (0.20)   
Right Opposition           0.893   
           (0.25)   
Law and Order            0.925  
            (0.15)  
Nationalizing Party (in Telecom)             6.346 
             (3.01)*** 
Observations 185 183 185 182 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 181 185 
* Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Regressions exclude Chile and Costa Rica, which established regulators before 1985, 
when our dataset begins.            
 
 
Table 6. Regulatory Agency Electricity* 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Under IMF 3.113 3.106 3.110 2.996 2.683 3.682 3.610 7.665 2.376 3.655 3.262 3.741 
 (2.04)** (2.02)** (2.01)** (2.01)** (1.97)** (2.09)** (2.73)*** (3.19)*** (1.52) (2.04)** (2.21)** (1.92)* 
Debt 1.026 1.026 1.026 1.023 1.024 1.022 1.019 1.029 1.030 1.026 1.024 1.021 
 (2.35)** (2.00)** (2.33)** (1.93)* (2.37)** (1.90)* (1.68)* (2.70)*** (2.39)** (2.24)** (2.32)** (1.95)* 
Budget   1.007          
   (0.07)          
Electricity Consumption 1.001 1.001 1.001  1.001 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 1.001 
 (1.23) (1.23) (1.21)  (1.58) (1.03) (1.85)* (0.63) (1.50) (0.78) (1.27) (2.33)** 
GDP per Capita    1.000         
    (0.20)         
Growth 1.155 1.163 1.156 1.140 1.147 1.180 1.200 1.194 1.163 1.158 1.172 1.093 
 (1.59) (1.28) (1.56) (1.43) (1.50) (1.56) (1.65)* (1.53) (1.46) (1.45) (1.62) (0.97) 
Privatization of Electricity  0.917           
  (0.12)           
Political Constraints     0.063        
     (2.32)**        
Divided Government      0.654       
      (0.63)       
Minority President       0.279      
       (1.75)*      
Distance        0.458     
        (2.94)***     
Margin         1.584    
         (0.53)    
To Left         0.432    
         (1.66)*    
Legislative Advantage          1.002   
          (0.93)   
Right Opposition          1.712   
          (1.02)   
Law and Order           0.675  
           (1.19)  
Nationalizing Party (in Electricity)            0.403 
            (1.40) 
Observations 195 195 192 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 191 195 
* Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Deciding what year to use for Chile was complicated by the fact that both the CNE and 
the Superintendencia have regulatory functions and they were created in different years (1985 and 1978, respectively). We decided to use 1985. However, we also ran the regressions 
excluding Chile (since we do not have data for 1978).  The results are practically identical, with the exception of growth which is non-proportional (and sometimes significant) in the 
regressions that exclude Chile.  





































































                                                 
1 Deciding which year to use for Chile was complicated by the fact that both the CNE and the Superintendencia have regulatory functions and they were created in different years (1985 and 
1978, respectively). Moreover, the CNE had no authority over tariffs until 1982. We decided to use 1985. However, we also ran the regressions excluding Chile (since we do not have data for 
1978 or 1982).  The results are practically identical. 
2 Was private since 1931, when Trujillo sold it to the Compañía Dominicana de Teléfonos  (see http://www.indotel.org.do/(y5r2dfm3l5a4ujbndddfbob4)/historia.aspx?article=202). 
3 IADB document says “partial competition” 
4 4 years of exclusivity alter first sale of assets (2001) 
5 We divided Margin by its standard deviation to make the result more intuitive. Electoral margins can be very small so coefficients for this variable tend to be very large. The interpretation 
for the hazard rate on Margin / SD(Margin) is the increase in the odds of reform when the incumbent’s margin increased one standard deviation. 
6 Since the differences between GDP per capita vary very widely, we divided GDP per Capita by its standard deviation to make the result easier to interpret. The interpretation for the hazard 
rate on is the increase in the odds of reform when GDP per Capita increases one standard deviation. 
7 We divided Margin by its standard deviation to make the result more intuitive. Since the differences between the values for different presidents can be very small, coefficients for this 
variable tend to be extremely large. The interpretation for the hazard rate on Margin / SD(Margin) is the increase in the odds of reform when the incumbent’s margin increased one standard 
deviation. 
8 We divided Margin by its standard deviation to make the result more intuitive. Since the differences between the values for different presidents can be very small, coefficients for this 
variable tend to be extremely large. The interpretation for the hazard rate on Margin / SD(Margin) is the increase in the odds of reform when the incumbent’s margin increased one standard 
deviation. 
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